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facturing goods decreases, whereas for the core, the price-index is rather
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1 Introduction
According to the European Commission, transport infrastructure improvements
play ”a key role in the efforts to reduce regional and social disparities in the
European Union, and in the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion”
(see Commission of the European Communities, 1999). Hence, the Commission
supports and endorses the development of Trans-European Transport Networks
(TEN-T) also 30 axes of priority, which now also encompass the new Eastern Eu-
ropean member states, for instance a corridor from Tallinn via Riga and Warsaw
to Bratislava and Vienna (see Commission of the European Communities, 2005).
Both the European Union as well as national governments will contribute to its
financing. According to the Commission of the European Communities (2005),
total costs are estimated to be around 330 billion Euros in the period from 2007-
2013, where more than half of these costs need to be covered by the member states
and other non-EU-related sources. Those TEN-T’s are a key element in the re-
vised ’Lisbon strategy for competitiveness and employment in Europe’, since the
EU considers good transport infrastructure, and good accessibility for and of all
its members as a key element for economic development in Europe.
The economic literature seems to support this view. According to Limao and
Venables (1999), the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to transport costs
is estimated at around −2.5, i.e., halving transport costs increases the volume
of trade by a factor of five. This belief is also shared outside the EU: Fan and
Zhang (2004) in a study on Chinese rural regions confirm that infrastructure is a
key to rural development, particularly in all non-agricultural sectors. Henderson
et al. (2001) point into a similar direction for African countries and regions.
In this paper, we look at the users of infrastructure, firms and consumers, and we
explore the links between infrastructure and its (public) financing through taxes.
The vehicle being employed in this paper is a simple New Economic Geography
(henceforth: NEG) model following Krugman (1991a,b) and Fujita et al. (1999)
with endogenized transport costs, where we focus on, (i) infrastructure, (ii) re-
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gional governments and taxation, and (iii) regional policy. According to Puga
(2002), those models are suitable for this type of analysis, since they focus on the
relations between transport costs, agglomeration, and regional disparities, which
makes them especially useful for studying the role of (transport) infrastructure.
The relevance of a more detailed account of public finance issues in trade and
geography models is confirmed by some significant contributions, referring both
to the revenue and the spending side of a public intervention.
On the taxation side, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that once we take into
account agglomeration issues, the standard ’race to the bottom’ result of basic
tax competition models (Zodrow and Mierzkowski, 1986; with stylized facts-based
extensions such as Devereux et al., 2002) is reversed: as industrial concentration
creates agglomeration rents for firms, they would still prefer to locate in the core,
even in the presence of a higher tax rate, provided that it is not too much higher
relative to the periphery. Two results are particularly interesting. First, the
level of trade costs matters, as the equilibrium tax rate gap between core and
periphery depends upon market integration. Second, when agglomeration forces
are sufficiently strong, there is a positive correlation between the capital-labor
ratio and tax rates. Such a conclusion can therefore raise the question − which
we investigate in a different setting − on the consequences on agglomeration pat-
terns deriving from endogenizing trade costs via public spending in infrastructure.
The quality and composition of public expenditures has also received some atten-
tion. Bru¨lhart and Trionfetti (2004) analyze the effects on agglomeration of the
government’s preferences for domestic over foreign suppliers. Using a dynamic
NEG-model, they show that such a home-bias in government purchases acts as
a dispersion force, thereby reducing the intensity of industrial agglomeration.
Keen and Marchand (1997), instead, focus on the composition of public spend-
ing, showing that in the non-cooperative equilibrium there is an over-provision
of a production function-enhancing public expenditure (such as infrastructure)
and an under-provision of public consumption affecting the households’ utility
function (such as recreational facilities or social services).
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It is important to stress that − unlike the above-mentioned contributions − we
do not employ revenue maximizing governments in the choice of the optimal tax
rate. We rather borrow the tools on the revenue side (distortionary taxes) and on
the expenditure side (transport costs-reducing infrastructure) to focus on their
joint effects on equilibrium core-periphery patterns.
Indeed, a better modelling of infrastructure and transport costs has received a
considerable degree of attention in the literature.
Earlier formulations of infrastructure modelling in one-region frameworks, such as
Arrow and Kurtz (1970) and Barro (1990) include it in the production function,
as some sort of general public expenditure; however, these contributions can
obviously not grasp the effects of public intervention on trade dynamics. In two-
regions settings, Andersson and Forslid (2003) build a NEG-model where tax
revenue is used to finance a public good entering the utility function, rather than
the production function, and analyze how tax increases affect the distribution
of workers across regions. Egger and Falkinger (2006) show that national public
infrastructure investments have positive effects on the number of intermediate
goods producers and the return of the immobile factor in the home country,
whereas international outsourcing declines. Opposite effects occur for the other
country in this model.
On the other hand, efforts to overcome the pure exogeneity of transport costs
include few relevant contributions. Mori and Nishikimi (2002) establish a link
with economies of density, which are supposed to be external to each firm. In their
formulation, transport costs are constant up to a given threshold of aggregate
trade; then, density economies come into action, and transport costs are a non-
linear decreasing function of them (defined by aggregate volume of trade). A
somewhat similar characterization is provided by Behrens and Gaigne´ (2006),
who distinguish between fixed unit transport costs (determined by technology
and infrastructure) and unit shipping costs, which vary with the total volume of
trade and, therefore, with the spatial distribution of supply and demand1.
1Other recent approaches of dealing with endogenized transport or trade costs in NEG-
models include for instance Mansori (2003), Behrens et al. (2006), or Duranton and Storper
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However, all these contributions do not look at the fundamental link we want
to focus on, namely the direct link between public intervention and transport
costs. The most relevant work in this respect has been carried out by Martin
and Rogers (1995). In their model, transport costs are a decreasing function
of publicly provided infrastructure, which can be distinguished between being
domestic or international. Their results show that trade integration will lead
firms to locate in the region with better domestic infrastructure. Differences
in international infrastructure alone do not determine the allocation of industrial
activities, but rather increase the sensitivity of the industrial patterns to domestic
infrastructure differentials. Martin and Rogers (1995) also analyze the welfare
consequences of increasing infrastructure provision through lump-sum taxation,
reaching opposite conclusions on agglomeration equilibria according to the type
of infrastructure being built (domestic or international).
Our contribution is inspired by this latter paper (Martin and Rogers, 1995).
The endogenization of transport costs comes in two steps. First, introducing
a corporate sales tax that generates revenue for the corresponding region. Lo-
cal governments allocate these tax revenues between infrastructure investments
and lump-sum transfers to support their consumers’ incomes. Second, the in-
frastructure is being built using the same production technology employed in
the manufacturing sector. The quantity of infrastructure provided is weighted
by a scaling and efficiency parameter, which determines the exact reduction of
transport costs which affects firms’ decisions on location and trade. Unlike Mar-
tin and Rogers (1995), we assume that infrastructure is only international (i.e.,
it applies to inter-regional trade only), but it is financed by distortionary taxa-
tion on firms’ sales and can only be supplied by the public authority. This last
assumption allows us to ignore possible crowding-out effects on the private sector.
Our results show that public infrastructure investments lead to more pronounced
agglomeration patterns, i.e. the concentration of industries is fostered, which
confirms previous results obtained in different settings by Andersson and Forslid
(2008).
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(2003) and Baldwin et al. (2003). This would suggest that only central regions
may benefit from public policy measures related to infrastructure.
Nonetheless, this is also beneficial for the region ending up as the periphery,
since also in this region, the price index for manufactured goods decreases, which
is due to cheaper imported product varieties. The reduction of transport costs
is very effective for high initial values of trade costs (i.e., before infrastructure
investments), while there are less absolute effects when transport costs are already
low. In terms of regional policy, it can be shown that it might be useful if
such infrastructure investments are only financed by the central region (i.e., the
periphery receiving for instance structural funds benefits by the EU, or - in terms
of our model - being a free rider in infrastructure provision), since both regions
benefit from such investments, while the periphery can spend its locally collected
taxes for local purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, while Section 3 investigates the core-periphery patterns, as well as the
effects of the infrastructure provided on trade costs and firms. Section 4 looks at
the sensitivity of the model and provides additional insights regarding the major
policy parameters. The last Section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
There are two regions indexed as {i, j} = {1, 2}. Both regions produce two trad-
able goods, X and Z. Z is a homogenous agricultural good produced at constant
returns to scale by a competitive industry. X-goods (manufacturing goods) are
horizontally differentiated in the usual Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) manner. Firms
may sell on the local market and export to the other region.
Quantities of both X and Z are indexed as follows. The first subscript denotes
the region where the headquarters and the production are based, the second
subscript indicates the region where the good is sold. Therefore, Xij are the
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exports of region i-based firms to region j2. Xic denotes the consumption of
X in region i, being a CES aggregate of the individual varieties. We assume
the consumer’s preferences to be a nest of the homogeneous Z-good and the
differentiated X-good. The utility of region i (Ui) can thus be formulated as
follows:
Ui = X
µ
ic (Zii + Zji)
1−µ ,
Xic ≡
[
ni (Xii)
σ−1
σ + nj
(
Xji
1 + τ
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
, (1)
where µ denotes the (constant) Cobb-Douglas expenditure share for differentiated
products, σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties, and ni shows
the number of manufacturing firms headquartered in region i.
We assume that Z-goods are costlessly tradable across regions, whereas X-goods
trade incurs iceberg transport costs (τ), which are symmetric for either direction
of shipment. In terms of quantity, one unit of consumption of an X-variety in
region j requires a firm in i to send (1 + τ) units. For convenience, quantities
of X are defined as firm-specific productions for the respective foreign market.
However, as in our model transport costs may vary with government expendi-
tures and thus the amount of infrastructure being provided (as outlined below),
transport or trade costs are endogenous to this model.
As usual, the consumer’s maximization problem can be solved in two steps. In the
first step, each variety Xji needs to be chosen such that it minimizes the cost of
attaining Xic, whatever the consumption of Xic is. In the second step, consumers
allocate income between the Z-good, and the composite X-good. Let pji be the
price of an X-variety in region i produced by a firm in region j. The price for
the homogenous agricultural good, qi, is indexed once, since all (indigenous and
foreign) homogenous goods consumed at a single location i must face the same
price qi. We take q1 as the nume´raire. Further, Pi denotes the price aggregator,
defined as the minimum cost of buying one unit of Xi at prices pji of an individual
2Whenever we use i and j from the set {1, 2}, this implies that i 6= j.
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variety:
Pi = min
Xji
∑
i,j
pjiXji s.t. Xi = 1. (2)
The first-stage budgeting problem leads to:
Xji = (pji)
−σP σ−1i µYi ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, (3)
where Yi denotes total expenditures of consumers in region i, and pji = pj (1 + τ),
i.e., the local goods price in region j (pj) including transport costs (1+τ). Identi-
cal price elasticities of demand and identical marginal costs (technologies) within
a region ensure that the price of a locally produced manufacturing good is equal
to the mill price for exports. Hence, prices of all manufacturing goods produced
in one region are equal in equilibrium. pi denotes the price of all goods produced
in region i. With these assumptions, the price aggregator, Pi, of differentiated
goods consumed in region i can be written as
Pi =
[
nip
1−σ
i + nj ((1 + τ)pj)
1−σ] 11−σ . (4)
Note that due to the adopted assumptions about technology, factor markets, and
demand − in equilibrium − the delivered prices of indigenous (pii) and imported
variants (pji, i.e., mill price including transport costs) of the manufacturing good
are the same in region i. The second-stage budgeting yields the division of ex-
penditures between the two sectors:
Xic =
µ
Pi
Yi, (5)
Zii + Zji =
1− µ
qi
Yi (6)
2.2 Factor Markets and Production
There is perfect competition in the Z-sector, and each firm produces under con-
stant returns to scale using a CES production technology, employing labor (L)
and land (T ):
Zi = [(1− b)Lρzi + bT ρzi ]
1
ρz , (7)
where ’b’ is the coefficient for T and ’1 − b’ for L, and (−∞ < ρz < 1) is the
technical rate of substitution between factors L and T in Z-production. As all
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firms face the same factor prices and the CES production technology is homo-
thetic and exhibits constant returns to scale, all firms in a region face the same
unit input coefficients. The region-specific unit input coefficients for the two fac-
tors of Z-production can be derived by cost minimization subject to this CES
technology:
aLzi =
(
wLi
1− b
) 1
ρz−1
[(
wρzTi
b
) 1
ρz−1
+
(
wρzLi
1− b
) 1
ρz−1
]− 1
ρz
(8)
aTzi =
(wTi
b
) 1
ρz−1
[(
wρzTi
b
) 1
ρz−1
+
(
wρzLi
1− b
) 1
ρz−1
]− 1
ρz
, (9)
where wLi and wTi denote the nominal factor rewards of labor and land in region
i, respectively.
Variable unit costs (i.e., marginal costs) cZi satisfy
cZi ≥ aLziwLi + aTziwT i ⊥ Zii ≥ 0, (10)
where ⊥ indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold with
equality. This implies
cZi ≥ qj ⊥ Zij ≥ 0. (11)
In the X-sector, instead, there is monopolistic competition, and again each firm
produces under a CES production technology, using labor and land:
Xi = [aL
ρx
i + (1− a)T ρxi ]
1
ρx , (12)
where ’a’ is the coefficient for L and ’1 − a’ for T ), and (−∞ < ρx < 1) is
the technical rate of substitution between factors L and T in X-production.
As all firms face the same factor prices and the CES production technology is
homothetic and exhibits constant returns to scale, all firms in a region face the
same unit input coefficients. The region specific unit input coefficients for the
two factors of X-production can be derived by cost minimization subject to this
CES technology:
aLxi =
(wLi
a
) 1
ρx−1
[(
wρxLi
a
) 1
ρx−1
+
(
wρxTi
1− a
) 1
ρx−1
]− 1
ρx
(13)
aTxi =
(
wTi
1− a
) 1
ρx−1
[(
wρxLi
a
) 1
ρx−1
+
(
wρxTi
1− a
) 1
ρx−1
]− 1
ρx
(14)
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Additionally, X-sector firms require labor (aLni) and land to set up plants (aTni),
leading to increasing returns to scale in production. Furthermore, the publicly
provided and tax-financed infrastructure (Ii) in region i is produced using the
same technology as we have it for manufactured goods, but without being subject
to economies of scale.
Hence, factor market clearing in region i for labor (Li) and land (Ti) requires
Li ≥ aLxini (Xii +Xij) + aLnini + aLxiIi +
aLziwLi (Zii + Zij) ⊥ wLi ≥ 0, (15)
Ti ≥ aTxini (Xii +Xij) + aTnini + aTxiIi +
aTziwTi (Zii + Zij) ⊥ wTi ≥ 0. (16)
2.3 Manufacturing Firms and Taxation
Taxes (taxi) are introduced as a distortionary sales tax. The profit function of
manufacturing firms therefore becomes slightly enlarged:
Πi = piXi (1− taxi)− cXiXi − FCni, (17)
where Πi are the profits of a region i firm, Xi is the firm’s output and comprises
of locally sold as well as exported goods (Xii + Xij), cXi are the variable unit
costs, and FCni are the fixed costs of production. The distortionary effect of this
tax can be seen in the resulting pricing equation (equation 18).
Variable unit costs of producing an X-variety in region i are given by cXi =
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi. There is a fixed markup over variable costs, which is de-
termined by the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given that under
CES-utility demand for all varieties is positive, the price setting behavior by
firms is given by the following equation, which is derived by profit maximization
and employing the Amoroso-Robinson-relation.
pi = cXi
σ
σ − 1
1
1− taxi , (18)
where pi is the consumer price for manufactured goods
3.
3From the profit equation (equation 17) it becomes clear that in a scenario without taxation
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Free entry and exit implies that firms earn zero profits, since operating profits
are used to cover fixed costs. The corresponding zero profit condition determines
the numbers of firms.
Manufacturing firms in i have to bear fixed costs of FCni = aLniwLi + aTniwTi.
The zero profit condition, therefore, implies
FCni ≥ pi (Xii +Xij)
σ
(1− taxi) ⊥ ni ≥ 0. (19)
2.4 Infrastructure and Transport Costs
According to the previously introduced taxation, pricing behavior, production,
and number of manufacturing firms, the total tax revenues, and subsequently
total government spending in a region, Gi, is
Gi = taxipini (Xii +Xij) . (20)
Out of these tax revenues, a fraction 0 < κi < 1 is devoted to infrastructure
building, and the remaining fraction 1 − κi is used for lump-sum transfers to
region i’s population, directly supporting their incomes.
As mentioned above, for simplicity, we assume the production technology for
infrastructure to be the same as for manufacturing goods, without being subject
to economies of scale. Thus, the amount of infrastructure provided by region i’s
government is
Ii =
κiGi
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi
. (21)
We assume that both regions’ infrastructure contributes to the reduction of trans-
port costs for shipments between the two regions. Hence, the resulting endoge-
nously determined value for transport costs is given by
τ =
t
(Ii + Ij + 1)
β
, (22)
when taxi = 0, the profit function would just lose the term (1 − taxi). As a consequence, the
pricing equation (equation 18) would also simply lose the tax-term, i.e. 11−taxi . Analogously,
we obtain the producer price in the taxation-scenario. The producer price for manufacturing
goods would just be the consumer price times (1− taxi), i.e. the price in the no-tax scenario.
This is because our tax is just a percentage on sales revenues.
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where t is an ’initial value’ for transport costs, which also corresponds to a ’no-tax
scenario’ without taxes and infrastructure, i.e. to the standard NEG-model with
exogenously given transport costs. It may also be regarded as general impedi-
ments to trade between the two regions, or as the amount of trade costs before
any policy interventions (i.e., public infrastructure investments in this model)
take place. 0 < β < 1 is a scaling parameter which reflects the ’effectiveness’ of
the infrastructure provided. Furthermore, note that both regions’ infrastructure
investments simultaneously affect the actual reduction of trade costs (τ).
2.5 Income and Real Factor Rewards
All factors are owned by the households, so that consumer income (i.e., GNP) in
region i is given by
Yi = wLiLi + wTiTi + (1− κi)Gi. (23)
The equivalence of total factor income (Yi, Yj) and demand in each region im-
plicitly balances payments between regions.
Real factor rewards (ω) are normalized by region-specific costs of living,
P−µi q
µ−1
i , and are thus given by:
ωki = wkiP
−µ
i q
µ−1
i , k ∈ {L, T} . (24)
3 Core-Periphery Patterns
3.1 Baseline Scenarios
In contrast to the standard NEG-model a` la Krugman (1991b), production of
the manufacturing good uses two input factors (L and T ). In those models it
is straightforward to assume that the factor used in the manufacturing sector is
mobile across regions. In line with the literature, all factors are immobile in the
short run. In the long run, we investigate situations where L (and manufacturing
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firms) is mobile across regions4. A long-run stable equilibrium is defined similar
to Krugman (1991b) by real wage equalization across regions (i.e., ωLi = ωLj).
The stability of a long run equilibrium can be verified by exogenously shifting
one unit of labor to the other region, and deriving the new short run equilibrium.
Then, firms are allowed to enter and exit to avoid losses and exploit profits. If
this reallocation of production factors results in a decline of real wages in the
receiving region, the initial equilibrium can be considered as stable. Otherwise,
the initial equilibrium is unstable, because even more workers have an incentive
to relocate.
Figure 1 represents the standard NEG-model, i.e., a scenario without taxation,
while Figure 2 is the benchmark scenario for all the subsequent alterations of
our model, i.e., the standard NEG-model plus taxation (with taxi = 0.2 and
κi = 1). Figure 1 is obtained by setting both the tax rates and, consequently, the
infrastructure expenditures equal to zero, and varying the initial impediments to
trade (t) between 1% and 99% of the price of manufacturing goods. In all our
bifurcation diagrams, λLi denotes region i’s share of the mobile factor, labor.
As it can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, the equilibrium locations of industries
show the well known Tomahawk-bifurcation in the terminology of Fujita et al.
(1999). Moving from the right to the left in our bifurcation diagrams (Figures 1
and 2), i.e., moving from higher to lower (initial values of) trade costs, we observe
one long-run stable symmetric equilibrium until t ≈ 0.38 in the scenario without
taxation (see Figure 1), and t ≈ 0.47 in the scenario with taxation (see Figure
2) − the break points (following Fujita et al., 1999)5. At lower trade costs,
we find three interior equilibria, two stable ones and an unstable one. There
are two symmetric long-run stable equilibria between 0.76 ' λLi ' 0.71 and
4We have chosen the following parameter values for all of the following simulations, also
in order to ensure comparability to other simulation-based NEG-models, such as Egger et al.
(2007): σ = 4, µ = 0.35, β = 0.1, a = b = 0.8, ρx = ρz = −0.5, L = L1 + L2 = 60,
T = T1 + T2 = 100, t = 0.7, tax1 = tax2 = 0.2, κ1 = κ2 = 1, λT1 = λT2 = 0.5 if nothing else is
mentioned, where λTi is the size of region i in terms of land. That means, the major differences
between the X− and the Z−sector arise due to the different types of competition and different
factor-intensities.
5In all our bifurcation diagrams we display the size of a region in terms of the mobile factor,
labor, on the vertical axis, and the initial value of trade costs, t, on the horizontal axis. Solid
lines denote long-run stable equilibria, while dotted lines denote unstable equilibria.
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0.29 ' λLi ' 0.24, respectively. These two partially agglomerated equilibria turn
out to be stable from t ≈ 0.39 in the scenario without taxation (see Figure 1),
and from t ≈ 0.49 in the scenario with taxation (see Figure 2) − again, moving
from the right to the left. Those two points correspond to the sustain points,
again following Fujita et al. (1999). Also at low trade costs, there is one unstable
symmetric equilibrium from t ≈ 0.38, in the no-tax scenario, and from t ≈ 0.47 in
the taxation scenario. Hence, the results show that the main qualitative results
from Krugman (1991b) can be replicated, i.e., there is agglomeration at low trade
costs, and dispersion at higher trade costs. Due to our production technology
assumptions (an immobile factor, land, is used in both sectors) there is no full-
agglomeration equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Standard bifurcation diagram without taxation and infrastructure, and
λT = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram with taxation and infrastructure, and λT = 0.5.
Benchmark scenario.
14
The subsequent analysis of the model is conducted along several lines of investi-
gation. After providing some intuition for the endogenized trade costs, at first the
standard agglomeration structure will be evaluated, which means for this model,
that the ’initial value’ of transport costs t varies from 1% to 99% of the price ofX-
goods. Since publicly provided and tax-financed infrastructure might be viewed
as quite many different things, and not merely − for instance − better roads re-
ducing travel times, we suggest to interpret the endogenous transport costs (τ) of
the present model more generally as trade costs. This is especially important in
our model, since regional public authorities usually do not have the opportunity
to influence ’pure’ transport costs, but they rather can try to generally improve
their region’s competitive position. Second, we look at variations of the policy
parameters which are of our primary interest, the tax rate (tax), and the fraction
of government expenditures devoted to infrastructure building (κ). This is also
useful to analyze the model’s sensitivity to parameter changes. Thus, the main
focus of the following analysis is put on investigating how the parameters which
may be influenced by policy makers shape the economic landscape.
3.2 Endogenous Trade Costs
In order to provide a better intuition on the effects of the endogenized trade costs,
i.e., the reduction of trade costs through infrastructure provision, the following
Figure 3 shows the relation between t (initial trade costs) and τ (endogenized
trade costs) for our benchmark scenario of Figure 2. We generally find that the
higher the initial trade costs are, the larger the absolute effect of infrastructure,
and thus the larger the reduction of trade costs will be. Hence, the absolute
decrease of trade costs caused by infrastructure investments is higher if the ini-
tial impediments to trade are high. This decrease would be even stronger if the
scaling and efficiency parameter β was higher, also at higher tax rates. In other
words, for regions being rather remote from economic centers and having high
interregional impediments to trade, it makes more sense to strengthen the in-
frastructure network than for quite integrated or centrally located regions where
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trade costs are already quite low. For a better intuition on the endogenized trade
costs, Figure 3 show the relation between the initial value of trade costs (t) and
the endogenized trade costs (τ).
Some of the above findings can easily be seen by inspecting the equations on
infrastructure provision, equations 20, 21, and 22. Plugging equation 20 into 21,
we obtain
Ii =
κitaxipini (Xii +Xij)
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi
, (25)
and plugging the resulting equation 25 into 22 we have
τ =
t[
κitaxipini(Xii+Xij)
aLxiwLi+aTxiwTi
+
κjtaxjpjnj(Xjj+Xji)
aLxjwLj+aTxjwTj
+ 1
]β , (26)
Inspecting equation 25, public infrastructure investments are generally facilitated
(i) by higher taxes since there is more money to be spent (of course we have to
bear in mind that tax revenues might decrease as the tax rate or the size of a
region increases − as shown in Figure 5 for values of λLi ' 0.75), (ii) by a larger
number of firms and (iii) by higher quantities being produced in a region (more
firms producing higher quantities pay more taxes). Consequently, this leads to
larger reductions of trade costs (see equation 26). Additionally, a higher efficiency
or better quality of the infrastructure provided (i.e., a higher β), also leads to a
stronger reduction of trade costs. Similarly, some external funding via transfer
payments (where ’external’ means external to regional budgets, which we have
not included in our model) facilitates and increases regional public infrastructure
provision. Clearly, infrastructure becomes more expensive, and thus its provision
decreases, as the factor prices and/or the factor input requirements rise.
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Figure 3: Relation between initial and endogenized trade costs. Benchmark
scenario.
3.3 Effects of Taxation on the Agglomeration Patterns
In Figure 2, taxation and infrastructure spending are activated by setting the
tax rates in both regions to taxi = 0.2 and κi = 1. As we have shown above,
the endogenization of trade costs through public infrastructure investments in
this framework leads the partially agglomerated equilibrium to be sustainable for
a larger range of trade costs. The infrastructure provided by the regions’ gov-
ernments allows the agglomerated equilibrium to remain stable for higher initial
(i.e., no-tax) values of trade costs. This result confirms Baldwin et al. (2003,
chapter 17), who find that infrastructure, facilitating interregional trade, leads to
increased spatial concentration. They also note that this subsequently leads to
higher growth in the whole economy (i.e., also in the periphery), and to a decrease
in nominal income inequalities between the center and the periphery. As far as
income inequalities are concerned, we find that the real wage inequalities between
core and periphery decrease after the introduction of tax-financed infrastructure
investments. In other words, comparing our benchmark scenario (with taxation
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and infrastructure) to the standard (no tax and no infrastructure) scenario, we
observe that the real wages in the larger region (core) decrease and the real wages
in the smaller region (periphery) increase6. This is a result of the combination
two effects, (i) the introduction of taxation, which tends to increase manufactur-
ing goods prices, and (ii) the reduction of trade costs due to the infrastructure
investments which reduces the price of imported goods.
The share of manufacturing firms in each region is proportionate to the share of
workers in each region, just as in any other standard NEG-model. The restriction
that applies is, that this is only true after a certain ’size-threshold’ in terms of
labor-endowment is either passed (for a small region) or undercut (for a large
region). This effect is driven by the fact that the agricultural sector requires some
labor in its production, and the manufacturing sector requires some immobile
land. As long as region i is very small in terms of labor (λLi smaller than in
the ’small-region’ equilibrium), it specializes on agricultural goods. If region i
happens to be very large in terms of labor (λLi larger than in the ’large region’
equilibrium), it specializes in manufacturing goods, and therefore attracts all
workers. This, again, explains why there is not the usual full agglomeration
equilibrium in our model. The share of manufacturing firms may, furthermore,
be looked up in the left panel of Figure 8.
Lower trade costs due to public infrastructure investments also influence regional
disparities. The price index of manufacturing goods decreases as trade costs
diminish. This effect is the net result of two opposing forces, (i) lower trade costs
leading to lower costs for imported goods, hence constituting a negative price
index effect, and (ii) more goods need to be imported since some firms might
have an incentive to relocate to the center, which in turn means that more goods
have to be imported in total, resulting in a positive price index effect. The latter
effect may even be strengthened by the introduction of taxation, which tends to
increase the price for manufacturing goods.
6Note that we use the terms ’small’ and ’periphery’ as well as ’large’ and ’center’ inter-
changeably, where the ’large’ or ’central’ region refers to a situation where the region hosts
more than 50% of the mobile factor in equilibrium; the terms ’small’ and ’periphery’ are used
otherwise.
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Figure 4: Difference in the price-index ratio for manufacturing goods between
the scenarios with and without taxes.
Figure 4 compares the price index-differences for manufacturing goods in the
benchmark case (represented by Figure 2) to the no-tax (and hence no-infrastructure)
scenario (represented by Figure 1). It turns out that the differences in the price
index-differential is high at high trade costs, and approach zero as trade costs
diminish. As a result, public infrastructure provision by regional authorities is
beneficial for the center as well as the periphery, since the prices for manufacturing
goods decrease in the periphery despite hosting less firms as trade costs diminish
(for the latter, see also Figure 8, left panel). Looking at Figure 4, it can be seen
that at low values of t, there are almost no differences in the price indices between
the small (peripheral) and the large (central) region. At higher t’s, the smaller
region’s price index decreases compared to the no-infrastructure setting, since
infrastructure reduces transport costs, and hence the price of imported goods.
The larger region does not enjoy these benefits since it hosts already the major
share of firms. This result confirms Kilkenny (1998) who finds that a reduction
of transport costs in rural areas leads to an improvement in rural development.
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Figure 5: Tax revenues corresponding to the benchmark scenario of Figure 2.
Figure 5 looks at the amount of tax revenues collected by regional governments,
which are then transformed into government spending. We find a Laffer-curve
shape as the size of a region varies. Tax revenues are maximized when a region
hosts approximately 75% of the workers, depending on the value of t (see Figure
5). Note that this corresponds to the long-run stable equilibrium for the larger
region in Figure 2, and thus to the size in terms of labor endowment (λLi) of
the larger region in the partially agglomerated equilibrium. Referring back to
equation 26, this means that there is an upper (efficiency) limit on the tax rate
(which also play a role in determining the core-periphery patterns), and hence
tax revenues. In other words, after a certain threshold is passed, too much
taxation does not lead to a further reduction of trade costs, since tax revenues
then decrease again.
Increases in the exogenously given tax rate (tax) cause the agglomeration equi-
librium to be sustainable for a larger range of values of t than in the benchmark
case, as long as the tax rate does not become too high. Quite similar effects
are observable by altering the fraction of government expenditures devoted to
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infrastructure provision (κ). The higher κ, the more sustainable agglomeration
becomes due to the fact that more (or better) infrastructure will be provided.
But also κi = κj = 0 does not lead to a symmetric agglomeration equilibrium
only. Of course, in this case, no infrastructure can be provided to reduce trade
costs, but at lower initial values of t a core-periphery structure emerges in this
case, too. In the case of κi = κj = 0, the bifurcation diagram is very similar
to the no-tax scenario (represented by Figure 1). The partially agglomerated
equilibrium is just slightly more sustainable than in the no-tax-scenario, but less
sustainable than in the tax-scenario (represented by Figure 2).
3.4 Free Riding - Policy Intervention
Now, we turn to a particular choice of κ, the fraction of government spending
devoted to infrastructure investments. We let one region ’free ride’ in infrastruc-
ture provision, i.e., we let κi = 0, while everything else remains symmetric. It is
important to note that in our model, free riding may not be understood in the
’classical’ economic sense, since we do not have any form of tax competition in
our setting. The issue of free riding rather is a policy-relevant scenario. The ba-
sic idea behind this scenario is inspired by the EU’s efforts to develop peripheral
regions via the structural funds measures7. All these programs have in common
the attempt to help peripheral regions to foster their economic development.
The idea is to devote external sources of funding (such as EU structural funds)
to infrastructure building, in order to allow those regions to utilize their own
budgetary resources for other purposes − i.e., in our model, lump-sum transfers
which strengthen the income base of regions. In this sense, we use the expression
’free-riding ’: a situation where the region benefits from the reduction in trans-
ports costs, resulting from external infrastructure spending, without having to
pay for it in terms of increased tax pressure.
If one region free rides in infrastructure provision, or has some external source
of funding, i.e. κi = 0 while κj > 0, a somewhat different picture develops (see
7E.g., the Objective 1 or 2, but also the various Interreg programs.
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Figure 6), compared to what we have obtained in our baseline scenario of Figure 2.
In this situation, there is again partial agglomeration at low trade costs. However,
the smaller region’s equilibrium breaks as the initial trade costs approach about
t = 0.5, while the (at low t’s) larger region’s equilibrium agglomeration path
remains sustainable over the whole range of trade costs.
Note that as the smaller region’s equilibrium breaks, the larger region’s agglomer-
ation becomes significantly less pronounced. This equilibrium becomes the only
one at higher trade costs, and decreases even slightly below λLi = 0.5. This
means that at higher initial trade costs, there emerges a picture which is similar
to the original core-periphery pattern, but slightly asymmetric. However, the
asymmetry is not as pronounced as one might have expected it to be. The free
riding region is almost of equal size as the other one (λLi ≈ 0.48). This is due
to the fact that there is no interregional tax competition in the present setup8,
and that the region which free rides in infrastructure provision transfers its entire
tax revenues lump-sum to its population generating additional income and hence
additional demand. Therefore, there are always some firms having incentives to
locate in the free-riding region, due to the classical home market effect. The
home market effect dominates for initial values of trade costs 0.49 / t / 0.63,
which induces the free riding region to become larger than λLi = 0.5, i.e., the
free riding regions host the larger share of the mobile factor, and hence also the
larger share firms. The reverse is true for t ' 0.63. Here, the infrastructure-
providing region is larger than the free riding region (i.e., λLi < 0.5). This result
arises because at higher trade costs, infrastructure becomes very important and
the infrastructure-providing region gains an advantage due to additional factor
demand from the infrastructure sector, which generates higher wages and hence
provides an incentive for workers (and firms) to locate there.
Looking at this result from a social planner’s perspective, we find that free riding
for a small or peripheral region is beneficial. A region in need of a better con-
8Again, note that it is not the intention or purpose of this paper to investigate the con-
sequences of tax competition, but to look at regional development and policy, also from the
peripheral region’s perspective.
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nection to the ’center’, therefore, should not contribute to public infrastructure
investments if initially the trade costs are high (i.e., before implementing any
policy measures). The reason is that the free riding region keeps their tax rev-
enues within the region and generates additional income through the lump-sum
redistribution of the tax revenues among its population. The strengthening of
the income base of the citizens of the free riding region also reduces the nomi-
nal income inequalities between core and periphery, unless the free riding region
happens to be the large region in the partially agglomerated equilibrium (i.e.,
the core). A better infrastructure, although financed by a different region, de-
velops the connections between those regions such that it becomes possible, also
for the more remotely located region, to attract additional firms. Note, that
instead of tax competition, the role of competition in this model is played by
the independent decision of each regional government to set its κ, i.e. to divide
its government expenditures between infrastructure investment and lump-sum
transfers to its respective population.
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Figure 6: Bifurcation diagram with region i free riding in infrastructure provision,
and λT = 0.5.
3.5 Asymmetric Taxation and Size of the Regions
Asymmetric taxation between the two regions exclusively leads to agglomeration
in the region with the lower tax rate (region j in our case; taxi = 0.5 and
taxj = 0.2). This is quite an intuitive result since the region with a lower tax rate
attracts more firms which in turn attract more workers (see Figure 7). Note that
region i always remains small in this scenario (it is the only stable equilibrium),
while region j is rather large.
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Figure 7: Bifurcation diagram with taxi = 0.5, and λT = 0.5.
A similar result, though through a different channel, occurs when the endowment
with land (T ) differs across region. In this case, there is agglomeration in the
region endowed with more land. This is due to the fact that both goods, X and
Z, require some T in production and X-sector firms also need land as a fixed
input for setting up their production plant. Only at very low initial trade costs,
agglomeration in the smaller region (in terms of T ) may be a long run stable
equilibrium (for t / 0.17 for Ti = 0.66).
Varying the scaling and efficiency parameter β shows that a higher β leads (i)
to a more significant reduction in trade costs (τ) which in turn makes (ii) the
partially agglomerated equilibrium more sustainable, also at higher initial values
of trade costs (t).
Looking at region i’s share of manufacturing firms and at the infrastructure pro-
vided in region i, we note several things. First, if region i has less than about
20% of the world’s endowment with labor (see the λLi-axis in Figures 8 and 9,
left panel in each case), there are no manufacturing firms headquartered in region
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i (Figure 8), and thus there is also no infrastructure being provided by region
i (Figure 9)9. The two right hand panels of these two figures show the same
analyses for asymmetric taxation (taxi = 0.5, while taxj remains at its original
value of 0.2). Figure 8 shows that due to the higher tax rate in region i, the
area without any manufacturing firms in region i increases by about 50%, and
hence also the area where region i is not able to provide public infrastructure.
From Figure 7 we know that the only stable equilibrium configuration for workers
emerges when region i hosts about 25% of the workers (in region j there are the
remaining about 75%). Hence, in this asymmetric taxation-scenario, only the re-
gion with lower taxes (i.e., region j) will host manufacturing firms (for all values
of t or τ). Thus, region i needs to import all of its manufacturing goods from
region j. This constitutes the same result as a full-agglomeration equilibrium of a
standard model, despite region i hosting some of the workers in our scenario. The
tax-rate-differential (of 30 percentage points) between both regions outweighs the
rather large share of workers in region i. Looking at the right panel of Figure 8,
if region i was very large (i.e., at a large λLi), manufacturing firms would have
an incentive to relocate to j because of the lower tax rate there, until the stable
equilibrium is reached.
9Note that in those cases where the share of manufacturing firms in region i is zero and no
infrastructure is being provided, also the tax revenues and hence government expenditures are
zero.
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Figure 8: Share of firms in region i (left panel, benchmark case) and with taxi =
0.5 and taxj = 0.2 (right panel).
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Figure 9: Infrastructure provided by region i (left panel, benchmark case) and
with taxi = 0.5 and taxj = 0.2 (right panel).
4 Sensitivity Analysis
Moderate variations of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the dif-
ferentiated manufacturing good, σ, and the technical rate of substitution between
input factors L and T , ρ, show that the model’s reactions are qualitatively sta-
ble. In terms of the bifurcation loci (and bifurcation diagrams), this means that
they are either vertically stretched or compressed (i.e., more or less pronounced
agglomeration equilibria due to changes in σ) or shifted to the left (right) (i.e.,
more (less) sustainable agglomeration or dispersion equilibria for higher (lower)
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values of ρ), as it has to be expected qualitatively by the respective parameter
change. The same applies for the income expenditure share for manufactures, µ,
where a higher (lower) µ leads to stronger (weaker) agglomeration in equilibrium.
Apart from varying these modelling parameters, we also simulate variations of
the two policy parameters tax and κ, where the main focus is placed on. We
refer to these two parameters as ’policy parameters’, since these two values may
be chosen by the regional decision makers. Additionally, various t’s for these
two scenarios are being tested. Varying the tax rate (tax) and the fraction of
government expenditures devoted to infrastructure building (κ) shows no effect
as the initial trade costs are high (t = 0.7). We have first chosen a rather high
value of t for this analysis, in order to be able to reflect the situation that may
occur between centrally and peripherally located regions. As all the bifurcation
diagrams show, there is always only a stable symmetric equilibrium at these
values of t. At t = 0.2, the opposite picture develops. Here, agglomeration
is a sustainable equilibrium for all values of both tax and κ, since trade costs
are simply low enough to render agglomeration sustainable, no matter how the
other parameters are configured. Hence, variations of tax and κ only affect more
integrated economies with lower trade costs.
As the fraction of government expenditures devoted to infrastructure investments,
κ, varies from 0 to 1, interesting insights may be gained as far as the development
of trade costs (τ) is concerned. The equal division of the government expenditures
between infrastructure investments and transfers to the population (i.e., κ =
0.5) leads to a reduction of trade costs by about 9% of the goods’ price. An
additional increase of κ up to κ = 1 reduces trade costs only by a further 3%
10. Thus, a region’s government needs to account for this decreasing effectiveness
of infrastructure investments when deciding on its policy measures. A higher
efficiency of infrastructure provision (β) increases the reduction of trade costs,
while the decreasing effectiveness of infrastructure investments remains evident.
Variations of the tax rate do not show any significant changes in the core-
10This comparison refers to the no-tax scenario.
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periphery patterns as long as they are coordinated in both regions. Also, the
development of tax revenues and infrastructure provision is unaffected by coordi-
nated changes in the tax rate. However, the effects on trade costs are noteworthy.
No matter what the tax rate is, when workers (and industries) are concentrated
in either of the regions trade costs are lowest (this corresponds to the partially
agglomerated equilibria of Figure 2, whereas they tend to be somewhat higher
when the regions are of equal size.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we look at tax-financed public infrastructure investment and its
impact on the development of regional core-periphery patterns. Associated issues
are the impact of potential regional policy measures on (i) the financing-structure
of those infrastructure investments, (ii) the core-periphery structure in terms of
the distribution of the population and firms, and (iii) subsequently also on the
income-base of the regions.
The vehicle we employ in this paper is a simple New Economic Geography model
with endogenized transport (trade) costs. The endogenization of trade costs
comes in two steps. First, introducing a corporate sales tax generates revenues
for the regions. Regional governments allocate these tax revenues between in-
frastructure investments and a lump-sum transfer to their respective region’s
population. Second, the infrastructure is being built using the same production
technology as for the manufactured good. The quantity of infrastructure pro-
vided is weighted by a scaling and efficiency parameter determines the amount
by which the transport costs are being reduced. These reduced transport costs
enter into the model influencing the firms’ decisions on location and trade.
Our results may be summarized as follows. First, confirming the previous results
by Andersson and Forslid (2003) or Baldwin et al. (2003), although in different
settings, we show that the introduction of costly public investment in infras-
tructure leads to more pronounced agglomeration: the core-periphery pattern
becomes more sustainable for a wider range of (initial) trade costs. Increasing
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either the tax rate or the fraction of public revenues devoted to infrastructure
renders the agglomeration equilibrium even more sustainable, unless the tax rate
does not become too high.
Second, the effects on prices are the following. With respect to the regions sizes,
for the region ending up as periphery, generally the price-index for manufacturing
goods decreases, since the negative import-price effect prevails on the positive
price-index effect. This effect occurs due to the relocation of firms away from
the periphery into the core (where manufacturing goods become cheaper due to
specialization), and through importing these (cheaper) manufacturing goods in
the periphery. Trade costs are low enough to render this possible. For the region
ending up as the core, the price-index is rather high, since the distortionary
effect of increased taxation (used to finance infrastructure) dominates. As trade
costs approach zero, the price-index in the setting with infrastructure spending
approaches the value of the same index in the setting without infrastructure
spending. As trade costs increase, the former price-index decreases, thereby
displaying the beneficial effects of public investment.
Third, free riding is beneficial for the periphery − in other words, centrally fi-
nanced infrastructure investments promote economic development in the periph-
ery. Put differently, regional or structural policy measures such as the EU’s
structural funds programs helping peripheral regions to improve their infrastruc-
ture make sense, at least to a certain extent. We show that infrastructure being
financed by the central region only makes its equilibrium agglomeration path sus-
tainable over the whole range of (initial) trade costs. Furthermore, the periphery
can devote all its tax revenue to local demand support, thereby generating addi-
tional income and a positive home market effect (which actually ends up driving
the catch-up process). Again, note that there is no tax competition scenario in
our paper, and therefore the free riding scenario may not be interpreted in its
classical sense, but we rather suggest to look at this from a policy point of view.
However, our framework lacks interregional tax competition, and the strategic in-
teractions between core and periphery regarding infrastructure building. We feel
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that in this direction, enriched by public finance considerations about different
types of taxation on different agents, some promising analysis can be carried out
in the future − in particular in the light of the recent and future enlargement-
process of the European Union.
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